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The abstraction called the Law is a magic mirror
wherein we see reflected not only our own lives, but the
lives of all men that have been.-Attributed to Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes.
It has been said that man differs from other animals chiefly
in this: that he retains in each generation that which has been
handed down by its predecessor,, and, after applying the touchstone
of experience, passes it to his successors. This commonplace has
been phrased in the folk saying, "Experience is the best teacher",
and in the legal aphorism that "the life of the law has been- experi-
ence". An outstanding characteristic of the founding of this re-
public was the tenacity with which our forefathers clung to their
inheritance of the laws which their immigrant ancestors brought
into the New World and adapted to the requirements of changed
environment. John Adams is credited with the statement that he
would not have taken the stand that he did in the War for Inde-
pendence, if such action had involved the loss of the common law.
Chief Justice Taft says, "We embodied in the Bill of Rights in our
Constitution the principles of the British Constitution as they had.
been established at the Common Law."'
At the threshold of the Revolution the American Continental
Congress of 1774, under the presidency of George Washington,
adopted this resolution:
"Resolved, N. C. D. 5. That the respective colonies
are entitled to the common law of England, and more espe-
cially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by
their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that
law.
"Resolved, 6. That they are entitled to the benefit of
such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their
colonization; and which they have, by experience, respec-
tively found to be applicable to their several local and other
circumstances." 2
2Foreword to JONES, A iwzcAN MEMBERS OF THE INKS OF COURT (1924).
2 JOURNALS OF CoNGREss (;8oo) 28.
(195)
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In a speech delivered in an early Virginia state convention,
James Madison based his arguments upon Blackstone's Commen-
taries and asserted that all of the delegates were familiar with that
work.3 Two of the states which ratified our Federal Constitution
retained their royal charters for years after the signing of the
Declaration of Independence. 4  Their citizens were practical men,
who felt satisfied with their time-tested autonomous legal and
political systems. Equally practical were the citizens of the other
states who joined in the conversion of the loose alliance, known
as the Confederation, into the Federal Republic, for they indulged
in no subversive jural theories, but "carried on" under their pre-
war systems of jurisprudence.
There are probably few phrases in legal terminology which
have more connotations than "common law". No attempt will be
made to define the expression, but a few observations are offered
as to some of its many applications. Sometimes it is applied to the
Anglo-American system, as opposed to the Roman or civil law
system. Again, it has been applied to the system originally en-
forced by the courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and
Exchequer, as distinguished from that of the High Court of
Chancery. At other times it connotes judiciary law-ex non
scripta-in contradistinction to statutory enactment. As frequently
employed in American states, the term "common law" comprises
all laws enforced in courts of general jurisdiction, other than the
enactments of the state from which such courts hold their commis-
sions, and thus includes the statutes (colonial, territorial, English
or state) of a parent jurisdiction. In a majority of the states of
the Union a number of British statutes are now part of the local
common law; just as much so as many passages of the Corpus
Juris are part of the common law of Scotland, which, like some
other jurisdictions which never were under the sway of the Roman
Empire, has "received" much Roman law.
It has been stated frequently that the British statutes still
extant in this country were brought over by the early settlers,
'An edition of Blackstone's Commentaries was printed in America as early
as the year 1771.
'These states were Connecticut and Rhode Island. See FISKE, THE ClT-
icAL PERIOD OF AmERICAN HISTORY (1888) 65.
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and that they survive because they have never been repealed.
With all due respect for the great names of some of those who
have attributed the survival of such statutes to tacit acquiescence,
it is believed that local statutory enactments constitute overt legal
authority for most cases wherein such overseas statutes have been
cited. Expediency and convenience, almost amounting to urgent
necessity, must have been potent factors in the survival of ancient
legislation. This may be readily conceded if one recalls that the
progress of judiciary law is by analogy to what is already settled 3
-"interstitial", as it is frequently described. In many American
jurisdictions vast gaps would appear in the law, were one to dis-
entangle and discard all that has developed from old enactments,
and nowhere does this feeling manifest itself more strongly than
in some western jurisdictions, which may roughly be classed as
members of the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain group. Thus,
the courts of Nevada have decided that a statutory recognition
of "the common law of England" 1 includes the English or British
statutes in improvement thereof, which were passed prior to the
Declaration of Independence, 7 and that the statute of 32 Henry
VIII, Chapter 34 (1542), permitting grantees of reversions and
their privies in estate to take advantage of breaches of condition,
is in force." Likewise, the statute of io & i i William III, Chap-
ter 17 (1699), declaring all lotteries to be a nuisance, has been
held part of the common law of Nevada.9 There appears to be no
compilation of British statutes in force in Nevada, and the local
courts seem to have relied upon such sources as Kent and Black-
stone.
The Arizona courts construe the "common law of England" 10
to include English statutes such as the statute of 13 Edward I,
IThe Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, ii U. S. 116, 136 (1812); Hodges
v. New England Screw Co., i R. I. 312, 356 (1850) ; Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn.
493, 515 (1842). This principle seems to be at the basis of the maxim pari
ratioie, eadem est lex.
6 ACT OF Ocr. 30, I861, c. I, § i, Copt. LAWS OF NEv. (Cutting, 19oo)
§3095.
See cases cited infra notes 8 and 9.
8 Hamilton v. Kneeland, i Nev. 40, 5 (1865).
9Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 1oI, io5 (1874).
10AcT OF Nov. 1O, 1864, Con. LAWS OF Amz. (1877) 571, Ariz. Sess. Laws
1885, No. 68; Luhrs v. Hancock, 6 Ariz. 34o, 345, 57 Pac. 605, 6o6 (1899).
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Chapter 34 (1285), providing that adultery accompanied by elope-
ment and uncondoned by the husband operates to bar the right of
dower.": While no specific limitation as to the date 6f accepted
acts of Parliament appears to be laid down in Arizona, the courts
have indicated that they will recognize the rules of such English
statutes as are generally in force in American states either as part
of the common law or as statutory enactments,'12 and the general
trend seems towards the position that amendatory British statutes
enacted prior to the Declaration of Independence form part of the
common law of Arizona.
The neighboring state of California is another jurisdiction
which interprets the phrase "common law of England" 13 as in-
cluding some modificatory statutes. In accordance with this view
the Supreme Court of California, in the case of Martin v. Superior
Court,14 recognized the doctrine of the statute of i i Henry VIII,
Chapter 12 (519), enacted to help and speed poor persons in
their suits, saying:
"It would be strange, indeed, if our legislature should
have designed to limit the applicability of the Code section
[Political Code, §4468] to the ancient and frequently most
barbarous rules and customs of the common law, and in so
doing refuse to take into account the mitigation of their
harshness and the broadening of the rules themselves which
followed the successive enactments of the English statutes." 15
This recognition of acts of Parliament as rules of decision has
not been mechanical, for local conditions and institutions have
had considerable influence in the determination of what English
law, whether judiciary or statutory, has been deemed applicable
Pendleton v. Brown, 25 Ariz. 604, 613, 221 Pac. 213, 216 (924).
' Ibid.
"AcT OF APRIL 13, i85o, CAL. COmP. LAWS (Garfielde & Snyder, 1853) 186;
Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 379, io Pac. 674, 746 (1886) ; Norris v. Moody, 84
Cal. 143, 24 Pac. 37 (189o).
"176 Cal. 289, 293, 168 Pac. 135, 136 (1917).
Compare HALE, HISTORY OF THE CoMmION LAW (3d ed. 1739) 162,
the Statutes of Westininster i, and Westminster 2. Gloucester and
Westminster 3, and of Articuli super Chartas, . . . are now as it were in-
corporated into, and become a Part of the Common Law itself."
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and therefore adopted. Hence the Statute of Enrollments 1 and
the Statute of Uses 17 have never been in force in California, and
the same position has been taken with regard to the statute of 43
Elizabeth, Chapter 4 (i6oo), respecting charities.,
The development of law in the Territory of Hawaii has an
interesting bearing on the general subject of this article. In i847
the old Kingdom of Hawaii inaugurated an eclectic system, by
authorizing its courts to adopt the principles of the common law
or the civil law, when founded in justice and not contrary to
Hawaiian law or usage. 19 This did not introduce the common
law eo nomine, nor as a whole,20 but the authority to borrow from
that system evidently was construed to include British statutes, for
the Statute of Uses was recognized as early as 1855.21 In 1892
the common law of England, "as ascertained by English and
American decisions", was declared to be the common law of
Hawaii, saving, inter alia, "laws . . . fixed by Hawaiian judicial
precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage". 22 While it has been
decided that statutes enacted during the reign of George IV and
Victoria are too recent to be regarded as part of the local common
law,23 the questi6n of the chronological line of division seems to be
open. It is probable that a line would be drawn so as to include
some statutes enacted in the reign of George III, as in the case of
Florida 24 and some other jurisdictions.
Oregon is another jurisdiction which interprets "common
law" as including British statutes. That system was introduced
by popular vote on July 26, 1845, by Section 2, Article i, of the
Organic Law of the provisional government of Oregon; was con-
tinued in effect by Act of Congress, of August I5, 1848; and was
'27 I-IN. VIII, c. 16 ('535). See Chandler v. Chandler, 55 Cal. 267, 271
(188o).
1727 HEN. VIII, c. io (0535). See Estate of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 535 (Ig0I).
'Estate of Hinckly, 58 Cal. 457, 490 (188i).
HAWAII LAWS (847) 5, HAWAII CIVII CODE (859) §§ 14, 823.
Kake v. Horton, 2 Hawaii 209 (i86o).
'Hawaiian Trust & Investment Co. v. Barton, I6 Hawaii 294, 303 (1904).
IHAwAII LAWS (1892) c. 57, § 5; I HAWAII REv. LAws (925) 146; Hall
v. Kennedy, 27 Hawaii 626 (1923).
" In re Craig, 2o Hawaii 447 (igii).
"Infra note 127.
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ratified as a part of "all laws in force continued in force", by
Section 7, Article i8, of the Oregon Constitution of September
i8, 1857.26 It has been decided that the common law of Oregon
is the common law of England, modified and amended by English
statutes, as it existed at the time of the Revolution; 26 and, in
accordance with this interpretation, the statute of ii George II,
Chapter i9, Section 15 (1737), providing that rent is apportion-
able where a lessor having only an estate for life dies before the
day upon which such rent would have become payable, is in force
in Oregon.
2 7
The daughter state of Washington traces its common law
to its code of i881, enacting that "The common law of England
: . . shall be the rule of decision". 28  By judicial construction this
includes modificatory and amendatory statutes, as in the case of
Allen v. Kane,29 wherein it was decided that the statute of 13
Elizabeth, Chapter 5 (570), anent fraudulent conveyances, is
part of the common law of the state. In this the state court differs
from that of the old parent Territory of Oregon, which, like many
other jurisdictions, has decided that the statute of 13 Elizabeth,
Chapter 5 (1570), was merely declaratory of the common law; 3'
but the case is important in settling that pertinent acts of Parlia-
ment, in improvement of the common law, are part of the local
common law. It is surmised that useful British statutes enacted
prior to the Declaration of Independence, whenever found to be
applicable to local conditions, will be deemed part of the common
law of Washington, when the question is properly presented.
In all probability the courts of the Territory of Alaska (which
region was governed at one time under such written and
unwritten laws of Oregon as were applicable to local conditions)
will eventually decide the common law of that jurisdiction to be the
common law of England as modified by English statutes prior to
2 United States Fid. & G. Co. v. Bramwell, io8 Ore. 261, 217 Pac. 232
(1923).
" Peery v. Fletcher, 93 Ore. 43, i82 Pac. 143 (1919) ; United States Fid. &
G. Co. v. Bramwell, supra note 25.
"Peery v. Fletcher, supra note 26.
' CODE OF WASH. (1881) C. I, § I.
79 Wash. 248, i4O Pac. 534 (914).
Monroe v. Hussey, i Ore. 188 (1855).
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the Revolutionary War, for one division of the District Court of
Alaska, in the case of Valentine zr. Roberts,31 discusses the statute
of 29 Charles II, Chapter 7, Section 6 (1677), prohibiting arrests
on Sunday except for treason, felony, and breach of the peace, as
part of the local law; and another division of the same court held,
a year later, in the case of In re BurkelI,3 2 that the statute of 13
George III, Chapter 38 (I773), making dog-stealing larceny, is in
force as part of the common law of Alaska. The later-enacted
Civil Code, which recognizes the common law as being in force,"'
and the contemporary Criminal Code,3 1 which includes the com-
mon law of England as adopted and understood in the United
States, point to the adoption of the Oregon and Nevada rule,
previously laid down in the case of In re Burkell.3 5
No indexes seem to refer to any British statutes as being
in force in Idaho. This is not conclusive, for it is frequently the
case in other jurisdictions that useful rules of decision are found
in the reports, which are not covered by official syllabi, and, as a
matter of personal observation, many British statutes have been
found, in the course of preparing this article, which are not in-
dexed at all. The Idaho statute,3 6 which recognizes as part of its
legal system "the common law of England", is similar to those of
California 37 and Nevada, 6 which, as already stated, construe the
phrase "common law of England" as including pertinent British
statutes. The substantial identity of the Idaho common law stat-
ute with that of Nevada has received local judicial recognition, 9
and, should the occasion arise, a similar interpretation may be
aI Alaska 536, 546 (igO2).
22 Alaska io8, Iig (19o3).
"ALASxA CoMP. LAWS (i93)_§ 796.
Ibid. § 2099.
'It may be interesting to note that, with the exception of Louisiana and
Iowa, such trans-Allegheny American jurisdictions as have formulated definite
rules about acts of Parliament mAy be divided into three classes: (I) those
which utterly exclude them; (2) those which draw the line at the year 4 JAc.
I; (3) those which include enactments prior to July 4, 1776.
'IDAHo CoMP.. STAT. (igi) § 946o.
CA. Por- CODE (1872) § 4468.
Supra note 6.
"Northern Pacific Ry. v. Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438, 454, i6I Pac. 854, 858
(igi6).
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expected. Indirectly, it might be argued that the statute of 3
Elizabeth, Chapter 5 (1570), directed against fraudulent convey-
ances, has been implicitly recognized as part of the common law
of Idaho, by reason of an unequivocal citation from Ruling Case
law; 40 but, as many courts hold that that statute was merely
declaratory of the common law, the point is debatable.
41
Whether English statutes modificatory of the common law
may be considered a repository from which to fill gaps in the juris-
prudence of Utah is speculative, if one considers the decisions.
One of the earliest reported decisions takes the ground that the
people:
"have tacitly agreed upon maxims and principles of the Com-
mon Law suited to their conditions and consistent with the
Constitution and Laws of the United States, and they only
wait recognition by the courts to become the Common Law
of the Territory. When so recognized, they are laws as cer-
tainly as if expressed by the law-making power". 42
Another early decision 43 takes the position that:
"Although the Common Law has not been adopted in
this Territory by any Statute, we entertain no doubt that it
should be regarded as prevailing here, so far as it is not
incompatible with our situation and government, and that it
is to be resorted to as furnishing to that extent the measure
of personal rights and the rule of judicial decision."
In the case of Mormon Church v. United States,44 it was
held that the Organic Act, of September 9, I85O, introduced the
general system of common law as it prevails in this country. The
case of Schenck v. Wicke 4r leans towards regarding the Statute
of Uses as part of the common law, but, fourteen years later,
there appears a dictum, in the case of Hatch v. Hatch,46 to the
0 12 R. C. L. 491 (i916). See McMillan v. McMillan, 42 Idaho 270, 274,
245 Pac. 98, 99 (1926).
"4 KENT, COMMENTAUES (3d ed. 1836) 462.
"First National Bank v. Kinner, i Utah oo, i07 (1873).
Thomas v. Union Pacific R. R., i Utah 232, 234 (875).
"136 U. S. I, 62, IO Sup. Ct. 792, 8og (1889).
"23 Utah 576, 65 Pac. 732 (igoi).
046 Utah ir6, 121, 148 Pac. io96, iog8 (i9i5).
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effect that English statutes form no part of the common law of
Utah.
The more youthful State of New Mexico, under a statute
providing that the common law, as recognized in the United States
of America, shall be the rule of practice and. decision,47 is much
clearer and more positive as to the extent of its local common law
than the senior jurisdiction of Utah, which is due, no doubt, to the
accidents of litigation.. Thus the provision of theStatute~of Limita-
tions, 48 authorizing an action of account by one tenant in common
against another,49 and the statute of 9 Anne, Chapter 2o (1710),
relating to information in the nature of quo warranto,50 are recog-
nized as part of the local common law, under enactments phrased in
language similar to that employed in some of the Utah decisions.5 '
Nebraska, Michigan, Ohio, Mississippi and Texas place a. differ-
ent interpretation upon the phrase "common law" than do the
Pacific coast jurisdictions, as all of them exclude acts of Parlia-
ment.
Many Americans are so in the habit of saying that the United
States does riot know how to administer colonies and has had no
colonial experience, that few- stop to consider that our first colonial
legislation antedates the going into effect of our Federal Constitu-
tion. They also fail to observe that, magnificent as has been the
work of many American physicians and engineers who have per-
manently stamped out pestilence and removed, many obstacles to
a healthful and happy existence, work in the overseas possessions
is frequently hampered by the absence of a codrdinating colonial
civil service. The first American colonial statute, familiarly desig-
nated in schoolbooks as the Ordinance of the Northwest Territory,
was enacted by the Congress of the Confederation in the same
year that the Constitutional Convention was held. It was copied
from time to time for about a generation. Unhappily the author-
"Acr oF JA. 7, 1876, N. M, ANx, $TAT. (1915) § X354-
4821 JAc. I, c. 16 (1623). Se Br.owniog v. Estate of Irowning, 3 N. M
371, 9 Pac. 677 
(i886).
' Armijo v. Neher, ii N. M. 645, 7: Pac. 12 (19o3).
50 Albright v. Territory, 13 N. M. 64, 79 Pac. 719 (19o5).
'Bank v. Kinnon, i Utah i~o, 1o7 (1873) ; Thoinas v. Uion. Pacifiq Ry.,
x Utah 232 (x875).
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ship of this historic statute is a matter of controversy. The Ordi-
nince of July I3, 1787, for the Territory of the United States
Northwest of the Ohio River (since subdivided into the states of
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin), provided,
among other measures, that the governor and judges should have
the power of introducing such laws of the original states as they
might deem necessary and suitable. 52  Under the primitive con-
ditions of the frontier such laws were published by writing them
out in longhand and posting them where they were likely to be
seen by the largest number of people. Among these statutes was
Law 176, copied from a repealed Virginia statute, introducing the
common law together with applicable English statutes which
had been enacted prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I.
This act was published July 14, 1795, and became effective October
I, I795." During part of the territorial period, and for a short
while under state government, English statutes not inapplicable to
local conditions, and enacted prior to the fourth year of the reign
of James I, were in force in Ohio,5 4 but since June I, 1805, no
English statute has been in force in Ohio as part of the common
law or otherwise. This fact explains the decision in the case of
Thompson v. Thompson, 5 that the Statute of Uses is not in
force in Ohio. Michigan, which at one time was subject to the
Coutume de Paris, as common law, has decided that, never having
been an English colony, English statutes have never been effective
in her territory, and that her common law includes no such stat-
utes.56
The state of Mississippi is another jurisdiction which declines
to include British statutes as part of the common law. In the
organization of the original territory the fundamental law was
copied from that of the old Northwest Territory,5 7 with the ex-
ception of the vague antislavery clause, and thereunder the com-
52 THORPE, CONsTrruTIONS AND CHARTERS (909) 957, 958.
53 I CHASE, STATUTES OF OHIO (1833) I9O.
"Ibid. i9o, 512; Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Ohio St. 585, 590 (1885).
W 17 Ohio St 649 (1867).
'Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358 (1861) ; Matter of Lamphere 61 Mich. IO5,
27 N. W. 882 (1886).
I AcT OF APRIL 7, 1798; 4 THORPE, op. cit. smIra note 52, at 2025.
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mon law was introduced.58  It was decided in Boarman v. Cat-
lett r0 that:
"no English statute has any intrinsic validity here [in Mis-
sissippi]. When the Mississippi territory was organized, the
ordinance secured the inhabitants in the enjoyment of judicial
proceedings, according to the course of the common law.
Toulmin, Dig. 473; Laws U. S., Vol. I, 475. This, together
with the provision in the constitution of 1817, schedule §5,
has been considered to exclude all English statutes, and to
adopt only the common law. .... "
The daughter state of Alabama takes a divergent view of the
meaning of the ordinance of April 7, 1798.00
Texas, while an independent republic, introduced the com-
mon law as the rule of decision "in all criminal cases", by Section
13, Article IV of her constitution, and, at the same time, directed
the congress to "introduce by law the common law of England,
with such modifications" as circumstances might require.6 ' The
Texas Congress, by in act of January 2o, 184o, introduced the
common law of England,6 2 but did not adopt any English statute
in aid of that system,63 and only adopted the system as "the rule
of decision", and not as a rule of practice. 4
Nebraska's adoption of the common law of England has been
held not only to exclude English statutes, but also to exclude the
common law of England as modified by the same. Thus the
Statute of Uses is not law in Nebraska, for the stated reason that
the term "common law of England" does not include English
statutes nor signify the common law of England as modified by
the same.65 It is submitted, with considerable diffidence, that the
doctrines of British statutes which have been held with more or
Morgan v. Reading, 3 S. & M. 366, 398 '(Miss. 1844).
12I Miss. i49, 152 (1849).
SGarret v. Lynch, 44 Ala. 324, 327 (I87o).
PASCHAt'S DIGF.Sr (1878) § 13, n. 138.
Courand v. Vollmer, 31 Tex. 397 (1868).
'Paul v. Ball, 3 Tex. io (1868), citing PAscHAx.'s DIGEST (I8y8) AR.
978, n. 418.
" Courand v. Vollmer, supra note 62, at 399.
sFarmers & Merchants Ins, Co. v. Jensen, 58 Neb. 522, 530, 78 N. W. 3054,
io56 (i8g9).
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less frequency in some jurisdictions to be declaratory of the com-
mon law, may be considered law in some of the states just men-
tioned as rejecting English statutes, if needed at any time to fill
gaps in local law, even where the same doctrines have been as-
sumed to be of a statutory origin in other jurisdictions.
Whether there are other American jurisdictions which will
definitely reject British statutes is conjectural. There may be
decisions to that effect which have eluded search, or some may be
in the course of publication while these lines are being written.
Montana lays such heavy stress upon the local codes and statutes,
as opposed to the common law, as to render it probable that few, if
any, acts of Parliament would receive judicial recognition as
part of the local law.66 The phrase "common law of England",
contained in the local statute,6 7 is susceptible of the rigid interpre-
tation given it by Nebraska and Texas, or of the more elastic
construction placed upon it by Wisconsin and Nevada. Jus-
tice Galen, in the case of Gas Products Co. v. Rankin,6" gives the
following definition of common law, which closely parallels that of
New Mexico 69 (whose interpretation includes reformatory Brit-
ish statutes):
"The common law has been a part of our system of
jurisprudence from the organization of Montana territory
to the present day. (State ex rel. Ford v. Young, 54 Mont.
401, 403, 170 Pac. 947.) The common law of England
means that body of jurisprudence as applied and modified
by the courts of this country up to the time it became a rule
of decision in this commonwealth. (Aetna Accident Liability
Co. v. Miller, 54 Mont. 377, 382, L. R. A. 1918C, 954, 170
Pac. 760.)"
A California enactment, identical in language with Section 5672
of the Montana code, has been held to include modificatory British
statutes.
70
0 Decker v. Decker, 56 Mont. 338, 345, 185 Pac. 168, i7o (1919) ; In re Con-
nolly Estate, 73 Mont. 35, 58, 235 Pac. 408, 418 (1925).
' MoNT. REv. CODES (12 Choate, ig2i) § 5672.
63 Mont. 372, 389, 207 Pac. 993, 997 (1922).
Ex parte De Vore, i8 N. M. 246, 256, 136 Pac. 47, 5o (1913).
Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 292, 168 Pac. 135, 136 (1917).
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It is also doubtful whether there be any British acts of Parlia-
ment which would be recognized as part of the law of North Da-
kota or South Dakota. A careful scrutiny of the indexes of the
North Dakota and South Dakota reports fails to bring to light any
satisfactorily definite ruling on acts of Parliament. This may be
due to the haphazardness of litigation. The North Dakota case of
Pratt v. Pratt 7 defines the common law as containing no statute of
limitations, a proposition which goes far towards establishing the
principle that no British statutes form part of the common law of
North Dakota; but an early decision in Maryland 72 made a simi-
lar ruling by deciding that the Statute of Limitations did not ex-
tend to the province, although passed prior to the first settlement,
and yet numerous subsequent decisions have established that Mary-
land, like most American jurisdictions, has adopted much British
statute law. 73 The statutory sanction of common law of the parent
territory of Dakota, 74 as well as those of North Dakota 75 and
South Dakota,7 6 are alike in enacting that "The evidence of the
common law . . a is found in the decisions of the tribunals"-
language broad enough to leave their interpretation to the untram-
meled discretion of the local courts. In the light of such a pro-
vision, a strong argument might be based upon any one of three
theses: (i) that no British statutes are included, as in Texas and a
few other states; (2) that pre-independence statutes are included,
as in California and many other states; or (3) that statutes prior
to the settlement of Jamestown are included, as in Kentucky and
many other states. The first thesis could be supported by the
literal argument of Texas, Nebraska and Mississippi, or the his-
torical argument of Michigan. The second proposition could be
supported by the reasoning of the Oregon courts. The third
hypothesis could be supported, in part, by striking a general aver-
age of the American common law. All of this is admittedly vague,
u29 N. D. 531, 536, i5i N. W. 294, 295 ('915).
Lloyd's Lessee v. Hemsley, i H. & McH. 28 (Md. 1712).
" AIX-XANDER, BrrisH STATtTE. IN FoRcE ix¢ MARYLAND (Coe's ed. i912).
7' Rr-v. COnE oF DAxOTA (i88o) 207, § 5; Comp. LAws OF DAKOrA (1887)
§ 2504.
, N. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (1913) § 4330.
" S. D. REv. CODE (igig) §3'
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but courts decide questions only when and as they arise. Probably
everyone who has had any judicial experience has had occasion to
observe fruitless attempts to obtain rulings upon doubtful ques-
tions of law, which efforts have failed because the accidents of
litigation have injected a turning-point precluding consideration
of points rendered irrelevant. It is most likely that the question of
the effect to be given to acts of Parliament, when squarely pre-
sented to the courts of North Dakota and South Dakota, will be
solved by considerations of public policy, necessity, and adaptabil-
ity to local jurisprudence and institutions. The problem makes one
feel the force of the English barristers' aphorism, "an ounce of
precedent is worth a pound of principle".
Oklahoma is another jurisdiction whose position on the sub-
ject of acts of Parliament is difficult to ascertain. The Con-
gress of the United States,77 on May 2, 189o, introduced chapter
2o of Mansfield's Digest of the Laws of Arkansas, Section 556
of which recognizes "the common law of England . . . and all
statutes of the British parliament in aid-of or to supply the defects
of the common law made prior to the fourth year of James I", as
the law of the eastern section of the present state of Oklahoma,
at that time a separate jurisdiction under the name of Indian Terri-
tory.7 In the same act Congress introduced into the remaining
portion of the present Oklahoma, then known as Oklahoma Terri-
tory, chapter 15 "of the Compiled Laws of the State of Nebraska,
in force November first, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, . . .
until after the adjournment of the first session of the legis-
lative assembly . . .",9 thereby temporarily introducing the
common law of Nebraska, which, as previously noted, excludes
all acts of Parliament. The present statute on the subject of
local common law recognizes "the common law, as modified
by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions and the
conditions and wants of the people".80  This is identical
='26 STA.T. 94, § 3I (I8W0)-
Is Carter v. U. S., I Indian Ter. 342, 35, (1896) ; Fainter v. U. S., 6 Indian
Ter. 505, 98 S. W. 352 (x9o6).
'26 STAT. 87, § ii (i8go) ; 5 THoRPE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2946.
, Oxi.. Comp. STAT. ANN. (1921) § 170.
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in text with the Kansas statute,"' and Kansas, like Arkan-
sas, recognizes statutes of the British Parliament enacted prior
to the fourth year of James I. Like Kansas, and unlike New
'Mexico and Massachusetts, Oklahoma has no common law
crimes, 2 and hence no British statute could be cited as authority
for declaring an offence to be a crime. It is fairly well settled
that no act of Parliament subsequent to the settlement of James-
town would be recognized as part of the local law. 3  There are
numerous dicta which would support the argument that useful acts
of Parliament, prior in date to the settlement of Virginia (the first
territory in the American hemisphere to receive representative
government), are cognizable as part of the law of Oklahoma.8 4
In addition, the established judicial formula that the rules of the
common law are such as are recognized and promulgated by the
American courts, 5 and the case of Evans v. Willis, County
Judge,86 following the line of demarcation of an Alabama deci-
sion,87 point towards acquiescence in the view of Mr. Justice
Story,8  that statutes passed before the emigration of our ances-
tors, applicable to our situation and in amendment of the law,
constitute a part of our common law. A word of caution, how-
ever. A decision concededly correct in its results is not, for that
reason alone, to be taken as a complete statement of an abstract
proposition, without limitation or restriction, when applied to a
case differing in its state of facts,89 nor is a case necessarily bind-
ing or persuasive authority for a proposition which appears to
follow logically from it.0
K Ix. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) 77-109.
'Prince v. U. S., 3 Okla. Crim. 7oo, Iog Pac. 24I (igio).
McKennon v. Winn, i Okla. 327, 333 (1893) ; Evans v. Willis, 22 Okla.
310, 97 Pac. 1o47 (r9o8) ; Painter v. U. S., supra note 78.
" Cf. cases cited supra note 83.
'McKennon v. Winn, supra note 83; Hoppe Hardware Co. v. Bain, 21
Okla. 177, 95 Pac. 765 (igo8) ; Maxwell v. Gillespey, Sheriff, ii6 Okla. 68, 243
Pac. 497 (1925) semble.
W Okla. 30, 97 Pac. IO47 (igoS).
'State v. Moore, 19 Ala. 514, Sig (i85i).
" Patterson v. Winn, 30 U. S. 233, 241 (1831).
' Holcomb v. Bonnel, 32 Mich. 6 (1875) ; Quinn v. Leathern, [igoi] A. C.
495.
Q uinn v. Leathem, supra note 89; HOLMES, THE Commox LAw (i88r)
36.
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A very large group of states recognizes amendatory English
statutes prior to the fourth year of James I; in other words, in
force at the time of the landing of the first English-speaking set-.
tlers in what is now the United States. The pototype of such
law was enacted by the Virginia convention of May, 1776, which
declared the separation from British rule, framed the first con-
stitution of the state, and ordained that "the common law of
England, all statutes or acts of Parliament made in aid of the
common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of King James
the First and which are of a general nature not local to that king-
dom" should be rules of decision."1 The Virginia legislature, in'
1792, repealed statutes and acts of the Parliament of Great Britain
hitherto in force, saving and excepting writs remedial and judicial
enacted prior to the fourth year of James 1.92 This repealing
act recited that all British statutes embodying substantive law
deemed worthy of adoption had been specifically enacted. The
exception of remedies and judicial writs is still law in Virginia "
and in West Virginia; the latter state deriving the law from
Virginia.9 4  It is thus that the statute of 2 & 3 Edward VI,
Chapter 24 (548), giving jurisdiction to the place of death in
homicide cases-where the blow was delivered in one jurisdiction
and death ensued in another, has been determined to be part of the
common law of West Virginia.95 As previously stated, the re-
pealed act of Virginia, recognizing acts of Parliament was intro-
duced by the governor and judges of the original Northwest
Territory in 1795; and, as already noted, Ohio repealed this at a
very early date, and Michigan decided that it had never applied.
Illinois practically reEnacted the said statute, 96 so that, with three
Passed July 3, 1776. I REv. CODE OF 1819 (Va.) 135; Foster v. Common-
wealth, 96 Va. 3o6, 31 S. E. 503 (1898).
I AcT OF DEC. 27, 1792, VA. CODE ANN. (1924) § 3; Dykes v. Woodhouse,
24 Va. 287, 291 (1825) ; Gallego's Ex'rs v. The Attorney General, 30 Va. 450,
476 (1832) ; Foster v. Commonwealth, supra note 91.
'VA, CODE (I860) 112.
" CON;STruTIoN OF W. VA. (1872) ART. 8, § 21; WV. Va. Acts 1882, c. 1J43.
Ex parte McNeely, 36 W. Va. 84, 14 S. E. 436 (1892).
'AcT OF GEN. ASSEMBLY, FEB. 4, 18ig, IL. Rav. LAWS (1829) 102; Penny
v. Little, 4 Ill. 301 (1841) ; 2 JONES & ADDINGTON, ANNOTATED STATUTES (Ill.
1913) 1401.
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slight exceptions, 97 the British statutes enacted prior to the settle-
ment at Jamestown, where of a general nature and not local to
England, are rules of decision, so far as consistent with the con-
stitution and statutes of the state. Numerous ancient statutes are
in force. Among them may be mentioned the statute of 4 Edward
III, Chapter 7 (1464), modifying the English common law rule
as to abatement of actions ex delicto, so as to give an action in
favor of a personal representative for injury to personal prop-
erty;9 the statutes of 13 Edward I, Chapter ii (1285), and i
Richard II, Chapfer 12 (1377),.giving an action of debt against
a sheriff for escape on capias ad satisfaciendum;9 and the statute
of 32 Henry VIII, Chapter 34 (1540), giving a right of action to
the assignee of a reversion against the lessee.' 00
Colorado, Indiana, and Wyoming follow the Illinois rule so
closely as to include the same exceptions. As just stated, the
Indiana statute dealing with the common law is a replica of the
Illinois enactment. 01 An odd situation in practice was solved
in the case of Swift i. Tousey, 0 2 by applying a statute of 21
Henry III (1237),1° 3 which provides that the 28th and 29th days
of February count as but one day.
Wisconsin interprets the "common law" 104 as including such
English statutes as were "part of the law of the colonies before
the revolution and during the period of their dependency upon
the laws and constitutions of Great Britain",0 5 and recog-
nizes the statute of 6 Anne, Chapter 3, Section 6 (707), pro-
'743 Euz. c. 6, §2 (i6oi), 13 ELuz. c. 8 (1566), and 37 Ha. VIII, c. 9
('545). Colorado, Indiana, and Wyoming follow Illinois in expressly except-
ing the statutes just enumerated in their local statutes adopting acts of Parlia-
ment prior to 4 JAC. I (I6o6), as part of the common law.
" Shedd v. Patterson, 312 III. 37r, 144 N. E. 5 (1924).
' Pumleigh v. Cook, 13 Ill. 669 (1852).
"'Fisher v. Deering, 6o Il. I 4 (1871).
10 1 IND. Ray. STAT. (1852) 352, 1 IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) ; Sopher
v. State, 6q Ind. 177, 81 N. E. 913 (19o7) ; Alsman v. Walters, 184 Ind. 565,
58I, i1 N. E. 92r, 923 (igi5); Ketelsen v. Stilz, 184 Ind. 7o2, ii N. E. 423
(ig96).
'5 Ind. 196 (1854).
The statute has no chapter number.
'" WIsCoNsIN CONSnTUnON OF 1848, AiT. XIV, § I3; 2 WIs. STAT. (r925)
2474.
" Spaulding v. C. & N. W. Ry., 30 Wis. rio, ix6 (1872).
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I
viding that there shall be no action for fire accidently begun, as
part of the common law; but, unlike New York,10 it considers the
enlargement of that statute by the statute of 14 George III, Chap-
ter 78, Section 86 (1774), as too close in point of time to the
struggle for independence to be included in American common
law.
The common law rule of Iowa is probably unique. In the
case of O'Ferrall v. Simplot 107 it was decided that a local act de-
claring that "none of the statutes of Great Britain shall be consid-
ered as law", did not include English statutes enacted prior to
"the union of the crown of England with that of Scotland" by
act of Parliament, in 1707. In the same case it was held that the
pre-Parliamentary Statute of Merton, 20 Henry III, Chapter i
(1235), providing that "A woman shall recover damages in a
writ of dower", is part of the common law of Iowa. -In the case
of Gardner v. Cole 108 the court changed the rule by stating that
the statutes "antedating the settlement of this cotmtry are part
of the unwritten law", which would mean statutes prior to 1607.109
This change was not adhered to, for we find, in the case of
McClure v. Dee,1" 0 the statute of 3 & 4 William & Mary, Chapter
14 (169i), extending to devisees the liability of an heir for
specialty debts of his ancestor, recognized as part of the local
common law.
Minnesota, like Wisconsin, Oregon and a number of other
jurisdictions, holds that American common law includes acts of
Parliament amendatory of the common law of England, passed
prior to the War of the Revolution. Accordingly it has been held
that the statutes of 2 William & Mary, Chapter 5 (169o), allowing
property distrained upon to be sold, and ii Ge6rge II, Chapter 19
(0728), covering the irregularity where landlords who are ten-
ants-in-common make a joint instead of several distraint, to be
part of the common law of Minnesota."'
Lansing v. Stone, 37 Barb. 15, 19 (N. Y. 1862) ; Rogers v. Ati., Gulf &
Pac. Refining Co., 213 N. Y. 246, 254, i0O7 N. E. 661 (1915).
"4 Iowa 381 (1857).
2I Iowa 2o5 (i866).
Cf. Nelson v. McCrary, 6o Ala. 301 (1877).
115 Iowa 546, 88 N. W. 1093 (1902).
m Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584, 62o (1877).
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Colorado, once a civil law jurisdiction, 112 has adopted the
Illinois common law statute,113 and, so late as the -year 1907,
applied the Statute of Limitations, respecting real actions, as part
of the local law.
114
Another jurisdiction which has copied the Illinois common
law statute is Wyoming," 5 which recognizes the widely prevalent
statute of 32 Henry VIII, Chapter 35 (1540), conferring upon
the grantee of a reversion the right to reEnter for breach of con-
dition in leases for life or years. 16
The common law of Kansas is based, by statute, on the com-
mon law of England and all statutes and acts of Parliament made
prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I, and not repugnant
to nor inconsistent with local laws and institutions, except statutes
for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors. 117  Hence the
statute of 9 & io William III, Chapter 15 (1697), permitting
-arbitration of disputes concerning real property, was enacted too
late to be part of the common law of Kansas ;n1s but the widely
accepted statute of 2 & 3 Edward VI, Chapter 24 (1547), pro-
viding that, where a mortal wound is given in one county and
death ensues in another, the latter county shall have jurisdiction,
is recognized as part of the local common law." 9
The laws of Spain prevailed in Missouri at the time of the
transfer from France to the "United States. 20  Shortly after the
close of the War of 1812, however, the legal system was changed,
and it was enacted that the common law of England and all stat-
"IHerr v. Johnson, Ii Cola 393, I8 Pac. 342 (I888).
1 Clilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo..4o, 45 Pac. 391 (1896).
1'32 HEN. VIII, c. 2 (1540). See Connell v. Clifford, 39 Colo. 121, 124, 88
Pac. 85o, 851 (1907).
IWyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. (ig2o) § 4547.
"1'Investors' Guaranty Corp. v. Thomson, 31 Wyo. 264, 225 Pac. 590, 32
A. L. R. xo71 (924).
I STAT. k. Trn. (1855) 469. A later statute, Acr OF Ocr. 31, 1868, con-
tinuing "the common law as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial
decisions, and the conditions and wants of the people", has been held to make
no basic change. Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 22i, 8o Pa. 57t, 576 ('9o5).
Stigers v. Stigers, 5 Kar. 652 (1865).
"'State v. Criqui, 1o5 Kah. 716, 185 Par. 1o63 (1919). The text of this
useful statute is set forth in great detail.
I Lindell v. McNair, 4 MO. 38o (1836) ; Reaume v. Chambers, 22 Mo. s6
(185s).
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utes and acts of Parliament passed prior to the fourth year of
the reign of James I, which were of a general nature, not
local to that kingdom, and not repugnant to nor inconsistent with
constitutional or statute laws, "shall be the rule of action and de-
cision" in Missouri.' 2' This is substantially the Illinois rule, but
for the slight exceptions previously noted.' 22  The workings of
this statute are well illustrated in the case of Baker v. Crandall,1
2 3
wherein it was held that the statutes of 4 Edward III, Chapter 7
(1330) and 31 Edward III, Chapter ii (i357), providing for
the survival of certain classes of actions of tort, are part of the
law of Missouri.
The daughter state of Arkansas has a common law statute
similar to the Missouri enactment, which traces back to a terri-
torial act of the Missouri Territory, passed while Arkansas was
still a part of Missouri.' 2 4 The case of State v. Ashley 12 has
been erroneously cited in one of the reporter systems as declaring
a British statute, subsequent to 1607, to be part of the law of
Arkansas. Very elaborate histories of the genesis of Arkansas
law are to be found in the cases of Cox v. Morrow 126 and Hors-
ley v. Hilburn.
27
The cession of Louisiana to Spain, in 1762, resulted in the
introduction of much Spanish law into the vast region known in
our schoolbooks as the Louisiana Purchase. This led'to the Siete
Partidas, of the year 1348, being translated into French and be-
coming an important element in the law of what finally became the
state of Louisiana. It has been mistakenly asserted by some com-
mentators that Louisiana has no common law, Not only has she
adopted the common law doctrine of precedents, but she has also
adopted the forms of indictment, method of trial, rules of evi-
dence and other proceedings of that system in the prosecution
"Mo. Tm. AcT OF JAN. ig, I8x6, Mo. REV. STAT. (I919) § 7O49.
Supra note 97.
'78 Mo. 584 (883).
''AK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, I92I) § 1432; Cox v. Morrow, 14
Ark. 6o3, 613 (1854) ; Horsley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458, 473 (1884).
= i Ark. 279, 305, 306, 310, 311 (839).
' Supra note i24.
Ibid.
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of crimes, in accordance with the common law of England, as it
existed in 1805.212 By recognizing the statutes of I & 2 Phillip
& Mary, Chapter 13, Sections 4, 5 0554), and 2 & 3 Phillip &
Mary, Chapter io (1555), concerning depositions in criminal mat-
ters taken before magistrates, it was demonstrated that Louisiana
had fallen in line with the majority ol American jurisdictions
in placing a liberal construction on the phrase "common law".'
20
So far as practicable, the state courts are exceedingly open-minded
in their use of materials for the solution of jural problems. As an
instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in 1839, decided that the
repeal, in 1828, of the Spanish, Roman, and French laws, which
were in force at the time of the cession to the United States, did
not extend to the unwritten law, but only to Spanish, Roman, and
French laws introductory of a hew rule, and did not include those
laws which were merely declaratory. 130
Alabama construes the word "laws", in her constitution of
August 2, 1819,131 as including the common law as modified by
"English statutes passed before the emigration of our ances-
tors". -3 2  An earlier dictum in the case of Garrett z. Lynch,
Adin'r,3 3 to the effect that British statutes enacted prior to the
Declaration of Independence are in force in Alabama, was super-
fluous, for that case turned on a local statute which happened to
be copied from the statute of 8 & 9 William III, Chapter iI, Sec-
tion 17 (1696). The legal system of Florida resembles those of
the Pacific Coast states, for, while her constitution of January
I1, 1839 (often cited in the reports as the Constitution of 1838)
empowered the general assembly to declare what parts of the com-
mon law and what parts of the civil law should be in force,'
3
1
she "carried on" under the act of November 6, 1829, ordaining
State v. McNeil, 33 La. Ann. 1332 (I88I) ; State v. Wheat, iii La. 86o,
871, 35 So. 955 (903).
State v. McNeil, supra note 128.
'Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 194 (1839).
i T~oRao op. cit. supra note 52, at 96, 113.
'Nelson v. McCrary, 6o Ala. 301 (1877). Cf. AiA. CoDE ANw. (1928)
§ 14.
m44 Ala. 324, 327 (1870).
''FLoRIDA CONSTITUTION (1839) ART. XVI, § 6; 2 THORPE, op. cit. supra
note 52, at 68o.
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that the common law and statute law of England, of a general
nature, enacted prior to the fourth day of July, 1776, should be
in force.'
There is a dim reminder of the philosopher Locke's scheme of
a palatine government for Carolina in the early history of Tennes-
see law; for that system is derived from an enactment:
"by his excellency, the palatine, and the rest of the true and
absolute lords proprietors of the province of Carolina, by and
with the advice and consent of the members of the general
assembly . . . for the northeast part of the province [later
known as North Carolina] . . . that all [English and Brit-
ish] laws providing for the privileges of the people, and
security of trade, as also, all statute laws made for the limi-
tation of actions, . . . and for preventing immorality and
fraud, . . . are and shall be in force here, although this
province [of North Carolina, which at that time included
Tennessee], or the plantations in general, are not therein
named".13
6
An interesting question of unusual scope arose in the early
days of Tennessee statehood, in the case of Ingrain's Heirs v.
Cocke,' 37 wherein the validity of judicial proceedings, under the
aegis of the de facto state of Franklin, was determined. In the
same volume in which the case of Ingram v. Cocke is published,
there is a valuable reportorial note by Judge Cooper,'13 containing
a list of British statutes which had been decided to be in force
in Tennessee, ranging from the statute of 34 Edward III, Chapter
I (136o), authorizing justices of the peace to bind persons "not of
good fame" to security for good behaviour, to the statute of 5
George II, Chapter 7, Section 4 (73), giving lien of judgment.
Since the enactment of the state code of i858, no statute of Eng-
land, as such, is in force in Tennessee; but it has been held that
this legislation did not abrogate the principles and rules of law
that had been adopted from acts of Parliament, and for the sake
I FLORIDA REV. STAT. (1920) §71.
I ScoT, LAWS OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE INCLUDING THOSE OF
NORTH CAROLINA Now IN FORCE IN THIS STATE (1821) 20, 22.
I OVERToN 22 (Tenn. i8o4).
Ibid. 169 n.
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of convenience such statutes continued to be discussed by their
original designation.""9
The neighboring state of Kentucky, in her constitution of
August 17, 1799,140 adopted "all laws which, on the first day of
June, one thousand and seven hundred and ninety-two, were in
force in the State of Virginia".'4' This, of course, included "the
common law of England and all statutes or acts of Parliament
made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the
reign of King James the First and which are of a general nature
not local to that kingdom".14 2  A frequently misquoted law of
Kentucky is the declaratory provision that "The decisions of the
courts of Great Britain since the fourth day of July, one thousand
seven hundred and seventy-six, shall not be of binding authority
in the courts of Kentucky". 1 43  Plain and unmistakable as this
language is, it has been repeatedly stated that no one is allowed
to cite a post-independence English opinion in a Kentucky court
of law. It is hardly necessary to remark that modern English
decisions are given the same consideration in Kentucky that they
receive in other American jurisdictions.
If Florida be classed as a Gulf state, Maine was the last Atlan-
tic state to be admitted into the Union. Her constitution of De-
cember 6, 18i9 44 continued "'all laws in force in this State".' 45
This system included the law of Massachusetts prior to the separa-
tion of the District of Maine from that commonwealth, 46 includ-
ing British statutes,147 and, in part, the usages and customs of
the early inhabitants prior to the purchase by Massachusetts in
1677.148
New Hampshire is another state which has inherited Massa-
chusetts law. The union of settlements in New Hampshire with
I State v. Miller, 79 Tenn. 62o (1883).
Ito3 THORPE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1277, 1286.
I ARTICLE VI, § 8.
" Supra note 91.
"'Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 2418.
'"ATICLE X, § i.
it 3 THoRpE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1646, 1664.
""Hovey v. Hobson, 5i Me. 62, 66 (1863).
"'Weeks v. Hill, 88 Me. III, 33 At. 778 (i895).
"'Conant v. Jordan, io7 Me. 227, 77 Atl. 938 (igio).
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the province of Massachusetts, which continued until 1679, intro-
duced a number of useful Massachusetts colonial ordinances subse-
quently recognized as part of the local common law. 149 Other rec-
ognized ingredients of the common law of New Hampshire include
equity,' 50 some provisions of the civil and ecclesiastical law,' 5 ' and
English statutes. 152 Among the British statutes recognized as part
of the local common law may be mentioned the Statute of Addi-
tions, requiring that the place shall be stated in which the defendant
was "conversant" (employed or engaged), in actions personal, ap-
peals, and indictments ;103 the statute of 3 & 4 William & Mary,
Chapter 14 ( 1691 ), binding lands in the hands of a devisee for the
specialty debts of his testator ;154 the statute of 12 Charles II, Chap-
ter 24, Section 8 (i66o), authorizing fathers to make testamentary
appointments of guardians for their minor children;15 and the
useful statute of 14 George II, Chapter 17, Section I (1740), em-
powering courts to give judgment for the defendant "as in the
case of non-suit", where a case has been brought to issue, but the
plaintiff fails or neglects to bring the issue to trial.156
When our historians enumerate the countries whose allied or
independent activities contributed towards the winning of our
war for independence, they seldom include an associated independ-
ent state which closely co6perated with the thirteen original states,
although it was not a member of the Confederation, and for some
years was denied admission to the Union. Vermont, whose activ-
ity in the struggle for independence is a household word, declared
her independence of New York and other objectors to her auton-
"'Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N. H. 524 (845) ; Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 66
N. H. 1,25 At. 718 (1889).
2w State v. Saunders, 66 N. H. 39, 7r, 25 Atl. 588 (1889) ; cf. Goodman v.
Carrol, 2o5 Ala. 305, 87 So. 368 (1921); Pennock's Estate, 2o Pa. 268, 274
(1853).
State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550, 564 (1837).
Ibid.
I HE. V, C. 5 (43). See State v. Moore, 14 N. H. 451 (1843).
Hall .v. Martin, 46 N. H. 337, 343, 352 (1865).
SMorey v. Sohier, 63 N. H. 507, 3 Atl. 636 (1885).
Wright v. Bartlett, 45 N. H. 289 (1864). There is a fairly long list of
British statutes decided to be in force in New Hampshire, in 2 HENING, NEw
HAMPSHnE DIGEST (1926) 1473.
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omy, on July 8, 1777;167 specifically as to New York and Great
Britain, and impliedly as to Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
A temporary statute, in 1779, established the "common law, as it is
generally practised and understood, in the New England States".
158
A subsequent act, passed in 1782, recognized the statute laws and
parts of laws of England passed before October I, 176o, as part of
the local system. 9 Some of the court decisions speak of October
I, 176o, as an arbitrary date; but it seems obvious that, whatever
the motive, the legislative intention was to exclude all acts of Par-
liament bearing the name of George III. The judicial conception
of common law is extensive, for it includes the legal system admin-
istered by the ecclesiastical courts of England. 160 Like some other
American jurisdictions, Vermont includes applicable British stat-
utes as part of her criminal law. 161 As is the case in California
and a number of other American jurisdictions, English acts of
Parliament which are deemed unsuitable to local circumstances
and usages, although adopted in many other jurisdictions, are
not recognized as part of the common law. In accordance with
this principle, which has been stated to be most emphatically in-
volved in the cardinal maxim of all common law, cessante ratione
legis cessat et ipsa lex, the Statute of Uses, which is studied in
practically all American law schools, has been decided to be not a
part of the law of the state.'0 12 The modern statute affirming
the "common law of England" as part of the local system 103 has
made no change in the law.
The left wing of the Puritan revolutionists effected a me-
chanical and indiscriminate adoption of biblical texts as law in both
Massachusetts and Connecticut, and, in so doing, overlooked many
fundamental principles, such as the privilege against self-crimina-
'1 6 THORIWE, op. cit szapra note 52, at 3737.
"Giddings v. Smith, 15 Vt. 344, 352 (1844) ; Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt.
29o, 3oo, 63 At. 146, 148 (i9o6) ; Comstock's Adm'r v. Jacobs, 89 Vt. 51o, 96
At!. 4 (1915).
' See cases cited supra note 158.
10 Le Barron v. Le Barron, 35 Vt. 365 (1862). Accord: Crump v. Mor-
gan, 38 N. C. 91, 98, 99 (1849).
" State v. White, 2 Tyler 352 (Vt. 1803).
"'Gorham v. Daniels, 23 Vt. 6oo (85).
'"VT. GEx. LAws (917) § r479.-
220 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tion, and failed to observe such post-Pentateuchal texts as Prov-
erbs 3:3 and Zechariah 7:9, extolling the quality of mercy.
This de facto rejection of much common law was checked in
Massachusetts by the Charter of William and Mary, of October
7, i69i, for that instrument authorized only such laws and ordi-
nances as were not inconsistent with the laws of England;""
a prominent feature of most colonial charters. The restoration
of common law was so thorough that we find nineteenth-century
Massachusetts decisions cited with respect in English, as well as
in American, cases of the highest importance. The present-day
rule concerning acts of Parliament closely resembles that of Penn-
sylvania. Primarily, useful statutes in force at the time of the
first settlement are recognized as part of the common law, to-
gether with such subsequent acts as were intended to be extended
to the American colonies ;16" and secondarily, a few acts have
been adopted which are not included in the first class, but were
adopted by the local courts because of their obvious utility, just
as in early times Roman law was borrowed to fill gaps in the
English law, and in modern times civil law solutions of jural
problems are occasionally utilized in English and American
courts.166 Judicial usage has incorporated some colonial ordi-
nances of Plymouth Colony into the common law of the state,
1 7
because of their obvious utility. This principle of utility rejects
"All those laws of the parent country, whether rules of the com-
mon law, or early English statutes, which . . . were . . . not
adapted to the circumstances of . . . [Massachusetts'] colonial
condition . . ." 168 The same principle has sanctioned the recog-
nition of such useful statutes as 33 Henry VIII, Chapter I (1541),
:' 3 TnoRPE, op. cit. s prca note 52, at 187o, 1882.
" Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 529, 534 (18o7) ; Sackett v. Sackett,
25 Mass. 309, 320 (1829). Accord: Anonymous, 2 P. Wins. 75 (Eng. 1722).
' There is a partial list of the acts of Parliament in force in Massachusetts,
in CRocimR, NoTEs ON THE GENERAL STATUTES OF MASSACHUSUT'rS (Balde's ed.
1925) 32. The table of statutes in col. 15877 of MASSACHEusETs DIGEST
(1906) is a medley of provincial and imperial enactments.
"= Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. City of Fall River, 154 Mass. 305, 28 N. E. 257
(i8gi).
' Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 112, 122 (1842). Accord: Fitch v.
Brainerd, 2 Day 163, 189 (Conn. 18o5); Guardians of the Poor v. Greene, 5
Binn. 554, 558 (Pa. 1813); Cbmmonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightly 36, 38 (Pa.
1821) ; Lyons Corp. v. East India Co., I Moore P. C. 175 (Eng. 1836).
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making cheating by false tokens an indictable offence; x69 23
Henry VI, Chapter 9 (I444), prescribing the, duties of a sheriff
in the matter of taking bail ;170 and the post-settlement statute of
3 & 4 Anne, Chapter 9 (1704), anent negotiable instruments.
171
A curious point of practice was solved by deciding a decree in
alimony to be a debt within the meaning of the statute of 13
Elizabeth, Chapter 5 (I570), as to conveyances in fraud of
creditors ;172 and a post-independence act of Parliament, the
statute of 46 George III, Chapter 37 (18o6), declaring that a
witness cannot legally refuse to answer a question relevant to the
matter in issue, on the sole ground that such answer may establish
or tend to establish that he is subject to a civil suit, was taken into
consideration, not as an authority, "but as strictly a declaratory
law entitled to weight", in the case of Bull v. Loveland.
173
The unhappy theocratic experiment in Connecticut, previously
referred to, was terminated by the Charter of Charles II, in
1662, whereby the colonies of New Haven and Connecticut were
united into one province with power to enact "wholesome, and
reasonable Laws, Statutes, Ordinances . . . and Instructions, not
Contrary to the Laws of this Realm of England . . . "." The
judicial theory of recognized acts of Parliament is that of inherit-
ance or adoption as rules of decision without the binding force
of statutes. 175  While there is a dictum in the case of Fitch v.
Brainerd 176 to the effect that British criminal statutes are not
part of the local common law, the opinion in the case of State v.
Ward 177 gives the text of the statute of 12 Anne, Chapter 7
(713), and enforces its provisions where a person in the night-
time entered a dwelling without breaking, for the purpose of
committing a felony, but broke out in making his escape. There
Commonwealth v. Warren, 6 Mass. 72 (i&)g).
1' Glezen v. Rood, 43 Mass. 49o (1841).
1 Pierce v. Talbo, 213 Mass. 33, IO0 N. E. 553 (913).
11 Purdon v. Blinn, 192 Mass. 387, 78 N. E. 462 (i9o6).
"27 Mass. 9, 3 (1830).
174 I THORPE, op. cit. s:pra note 52, at 529, 533.
' Fitch v. Brainerd, supra note 168; Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. I68, I8S
(185I) ; State v. Ward, 43 Conn. 489 (1876).17Supra note 175, at i8g.
1w Supraz note i75.
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are other statutes adopted subsequent to the acceptance of the
charter, among which may be mentioned the familiar statute of
9 Anne, Chapter 2o (1710), concerning mandamus ;17 11 and the
statute of 4 Anne, Chapter i6, Section 9 (0705), making the
conveyance of a remainder or reversion effectual without attorn-
ment of the tenant. 17 9
Rhode Island is probably the first political entity in the west-
ern hemisphere which established the principle that the Church
should not intermeddle with the State and the State should not
interfere with the Church. The consequence has been a dearth of
erratic and mischief-breeding legislation. An act of April 30,
17oo adopted the English statute as well as the common law,
in all cases not otherwise provided for.'80 Another act, passed
in 1749, made further provision on the subject.'' A subsequent
act, in 1798, provided that "in all cases in which provision is not
made, either at common law, or by the statutes aforesaid, the stat-
ute laws of England, which have been heretofore introduced into
practice in this State, shall continue to be in force".'8 2 The pres-
ent day rule is that English statutes introduced before the Declara-
tion of Independence, which have continued in force, are "deemed
and taken as a part of the common law of the state". 8 " An in-
teresting history of the introduction of English statutes is con-
tained in the opinion of Justice Dubois, in the case of Tucker
v. Denico, 8 4 deciding that the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries,
29 Charles II, Chapter 3 (1677), is part of the common law of
Rhode Island. Another interesting opinion appears in the case of
Reynolds v. Hennessy,15 deciding that damage to an interest in
property by way of lien or security is a damage to personal estate
within the meaning of the statute of 4 Edward II, Chapter 7
(310), giving executors an action of trespass for a wrong done
Strong's Case, Kirby 345, 351 (Conn. 1787).
1 State v. Ward, supra note 175.
Steere v. Field, 2 Mason 486 (C. C. R. I. 1822).
' Exeter v. Warwick, i R. I. 63 (1834) ; Tucker v. Denico, 27 R. I. 239, 6i
Atl. 642 (z9o5).
Punic LAws oF R. I. (1798) 78.
R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 6754.
u'Supra note I8I.
1U 7 R. I. 169, 172, 23 Atl. 639 (189o).
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to their testator. Criminal acts of Parliament are also included
in the local law, as shown by the recent case of State v. Mc-
Mahon,186 which held that the statutes of 32 Henry VIII, Chapter
I, Sections 1, 2 (I54O), and 3o George II, Chapter 24 (756),
creating the offence of cheating by false pretences, are in force in
Rhode Island.1
8 7
Despite the decision in Mortimer v. New York Elevated
R. R.,'11 to the effect that rights which accrued during the Dutch
rule were governed by the rules of the common law, because of the
English title by discovery, there still remain traces of Roman
Dutch law in New Yiork, such as the civil law rules governing
the title to the river beds of the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers, and
the rule that the construction of Dutch grants be in accordance
with Dutch law. The first constitution of New York, that of
April 20, 1777, was drafted by John Jay. It ordained that such
parts of the common law of England and of the statutes of Eng-
land and Great Britain as were in effect April 19, 1775, should
be and continue part of the law of the state."8 9 By an act of
December IO, 1828,19° it was provided that:
"3. None of the statutes of England or Great Britain
shall be considered as laws of this state; nor shall they be
deemed to have any force or effect in this state, since the first
of May in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-
eight.
"4. No statutes passed by the government of the late
colony of New York, shall be considered as law in this state."
This repealing act, at least the third section, has been empha-
sized by repeated reEnactment.' 91 It sounds emphatic, but in the
case of Lansing v. Stone 192 the court held that the statute of
6 Anne, Chapter 31, Section 6 (0707), as reEnacted and enlarged
140 At. 359 (R. I. 1928).
'A list of British statutes in force in the state will be found in the index
of R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923).
57 Super. 244, 6 N. Y. Supp. 898 (889).
' 5 TnoRPE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2635.
2W 1 EDMONDS, STATUTES AT LARGE (2d ed. 1872) 72.
2u STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION LAW, N. Y. Laws 1892, c. 677, § 3o GENERAL
CoNsTmucnIoN LAW, N. Y. Laws x9o9, c. 7.
'm 37 Barb. Is, ig (N. Y. 1862).
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by the statute of 14 George III, Chapter 78, Section 86 (1774),
providing that no action should lie for damage caused by acci-
dental fire, is part of the common law, for the stated reason that,
"no repealing act of our legislature, not even that passed
December IO, 1828 (2 R. S. 779), is applicable to English
or colonial statutes which were part of the common law of
New York. This conclusion is supported by the opinions of
Chancellors Walworth and Kent."
In the year 1915, the foregoing decision was approved and fol-
lowed in Rogers v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Refining Co.' 3 There
are many other New York decisions recognizing British statutes
as part of the extant New York common law. Among them may
be mentioned Bogardus v. Trinity Church,'9 4 citing the statutes of
limitations of 32 Henry VIII, Chapter 2 (1540), and 21 James I,
Chapter 16 (1623) ; People ex rel. Brown v. Supervisors of Onon-
daga,'95 following the statute of ii HenryVII, Chapter 12 (1495),
providing free writs and free counsel to poor people; and Cahill
Iron Works v. Pemberton,'9" asserting the Statute of Frauds, 29
Charles II, Chapter 3 (1677), to be part of the common law of
New York. The early case of People v. Hennessy 197 states that
the statute of 21 Henry VIII, Chapter 7 (1529),19S providing that
servants embezzling goods should be punished as felons, is in force
in New York, having been "reEnacted in 1788, I R. L. 112"; and
it was said by the court in the recent case of Harmon v. Peats 099
that an act of February 26, 1787 200 reenacted such parts of the
common law of England and of the statute laws of England and
Great Britain and of the acts of the legislature of New York, as
were in force April 19, 1775, and became a legislative declaration
that the statutes therein mentioned had been extended to the colony
U213 N. Y. 246, 254, 107 N. E. 661, 662 (1915), [Igi6C] ANN. CAS. 877.
2"4 Paige 178, 198 (N. Y. 1833)
4 N. Y. Crim. iO (1886).
"3o Abb. New Cas. 450, 27 N. Y. Supp. 927, 93o (1893).
15 Wend. 147, 157 (N. Y. 1836).
This statute had been revived by the statute of 5 Euz. c. io (1563).
216 App. Div. 368, 214 N. Y. Supp. 353 (1926).
'JONES & VARIcK, LAWS OF THE STATE (778-89) (1789) 88.
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of New York by the Constitution of 1777, and were part of the
common law. Seemingly the reEnacting statute, which the writer
has had no opportunity of consulting, was a law giving the stat-
utes therein enumerated the elastic force and effect of rules of
decision, and was not affected by the numerous repealing acts,
only a few of which have been mentioned in this article.
The old rule in New Jersey was that British statutes passed
prior to the surrender of the proprietary governments of the
provinces of East Jersey and West Jersey to Queen Anne, on
April 15, 1702, extended to united New Jersey.2°" Numerous
British statutes continued in force until June 13, 1799,202 at
which time it was enacted "that from and after the passing of
this act, no statute or act of the parliament of England or of
Great Britain shall be in force or authority within this State,
or be considered as a law thereof".20 3 This New Jersey repealing
act seems to have been decisive, 20 4 although the names of British
statutes reappear like the original text in a palimpsest; as in the
case of Read v. Penna. R. R.,2 °3 where the court quotes the statute
of 6 Anne, Chapter 31 (1707), providing that there shall be "no
process against a person in whose house or chamber any fire shall
accidentally appear", and then cites local statutes in which the
provisions of said statute are said to have been incorporated.
None of the Swedish law in force during the original settle-
ment of Pennsylvania survived the Dutch conquest. 20 6 The inter-
vening Roman Dutch law succumbed to the English conquest, with
the exception of the principle of arbitration.20 7  Pennsylvania's
legal system is derived from the Charter to William Penn of
March 4, I682, granted as compensation for a debt incurred by
Oliver Cromwell's government to Penn's father, for expenses
incurred in the conquest of Jamaica. The charter is unique in
that the Statute of Quia Emptores (against sub-infeudation) was
'State v. M~alrs, i N. J. L. 335 (1795).
'1In re Thompson, 85 N. J. Eq. 221, 246, 96 AtI. 1O2, 113 (1915).
'LAws OF N. J. (80D) 434.
In re Thompson, supra note 2o2.
'44 N. J. L. 28o, 282 (1882).
=' LoYD, EARLi COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA (1910) 3.
0 Ibid. 15.
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specially excepted. 208  Judges and practitioners in those American
jurisdictions whose legislatures impose upon local tribunals the
duty of taking judicial notice of the statute and judiciary law of
sister states-a class which seems to be increasing in number-
will find their difficulties much lightened, in the field of the applica-
bility of acts of parliament in Pennsylvania, by the convenient
accessibility of the noteworthy Report of the Judges, of December
14, 18o8.209 The late Chief Justice Mitchell (at that time an
Associate Justice), with characteristic lucidity, estimates the
weight of this report (which it is submitted is slightly less than
that of a series of precedents, and much greater than that of an
advisory opinion), in the judicial formula: "The presumption
against a statute by its omission from the report is not, of
course, so strong as the presumption in its favor by its affirmative
inclusion; but it is still of great weight . -210 The present
Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, while an Associate Justice, in the
case of Kimberley's Estate (No. 3.),211 having occasion to discuss
and analyze the statute of 43 Elizabeth, Chapter 4 (16oo), con-
cerning charitable purposes, pointed out that the principles of the
common law will not be restricted by the letter of an ancient
statute which is partially declaratory; and, therefore, he held that
this statute, although passed prior to the grant of the Charter of
William Penn, is not part of the common law of Pennsylvania.
The text of virtually every act of Parliament in force in the com-
monwealth is to be found in Judge Roberts' British Statutes in
Pennsylvania. The acts of Parliament which have been held to be
in force although not enumerated in the Judges' Report are very
few. Among them may be mentioned 13 George II, Chapter 7
(1739), making the naturalization of foreigners a subject of
judicial cognizance ;212 4 George II, Chapter 20, Sections 4 and 5
(730), 21 James I, Chapter 16 (1623), and io & ii William
III, Chapter 14 (1698), dealing with common recoveries ;213 the
"M 5 THORPE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 3042.
W93 Binn. 595 (Pa. i8o8).
'0 Gardner v. Kiehl, 182 Pa. 194, 200, 37 Ati. 829, 83o (1897).
S249 Pa. 483, 95 Atl. 86 (9W5).
'Rump v. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. 475 (1858).
' Ransley v. Stott, 26 Pa. 126, 130 (I856).
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Statute of Limitations ;214 and the statute of 4 & 5 Anne, Chapter
16 (1705), concerning costs.215 An indirect recognition of a post-
independence British enactment, the act of 26 George III, Chapter
57, Section 38 (1786), is found in the case of Clark and Sander-
son,2 1 6 wherein a derivative principle was applied in admitting
proof of the handwriting of a subscribing witness. Chief Justice
Sharswood took a step further in the case of Kane v. Common-
wealth,217 by a direct citation of Fox's Bill, 32 George III, Chap-
ter 6o (1792), as a declaratory statute settling the law that it is
competent for the jury in all cases of indictment or information
for libel to give a verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole
matter put in issue..
2 1 8
Swedish and Dutch law seem to have left as little trace in
Delaware as in Pennsylvania. In 1719 210 the colonial legislature,
in a preamble to the twenty-second chapter of the legislation of
that year, observed that "acts of Parliament have been adjudged
not to extend to these plantations, except when they are particu-
larly named in the body of such acts". It then took steps to supply
deficiencies, chiefly by way of incorporation by implication, as well
as, in a few instances, incorporating a few acts of Parliament
by name. This action was followed a few years later 220 by legis-
lation conferring upon certain courts the powers of justices of the
courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. 22 1  Ar-
ticle 25 of the constitution of September 20, 1776, continued "the
common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law
as has been heretofore adopted in practicein this state . . .Y).222
It is surmised that the reception of the common law of England
"'Boehn v. Engle, I Dallas i5 (Pa. 1766); Morris v. Vanderen, I Dallas
64 (Pa. 1782).
"Black's Appeal, io6 Pa. 344 (1884).
"53 Birn. 192 (Pa. i8io).
"7 W. N. C. I49 (Pa. 1879).
'Very useful references to Pennsylvania decisions on British statutes in
Pennsylvania are to be found in 8 VALE, PE-NNSYLVAIA DIGEST (1911) 24962-
24965; GOOD, INDEX OF PENNSYLVANrA STATUTES (2d ed. 19o8) 27.
2- I LAWS OF DEo- (1792) C. 22a, § 9.
SBetween 1726 and 1736. DEL Dix. (1829) 101, IO-.
I LAws OF DEr (797) c. LIVa, § 7.
I LAWS OF Dg. (1797) Appendix, 89.
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and applicable acts of Parliament in approval thereof took place
on the acceptance of the charter by William Penn, which took
effect October 28, 1708.223 There does not appear to be any
publication giving lists of acts of Parliament which have been
decided to be in force in Delaware. The useful statute of 32
Henry VIII, Chapter 32 (540), giving joint tenants and tenants-
in-common for life or years a right to an action of partition, has
been decided to be in force,2 2 4 as has also the statute of 4 Anne,
Chapter 16, Section 12 (I705), enabling a defendant in an action
of debt or scire facias sur judgment to plead payment ;225 but sec-
tion 17 of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Charles II, Chapter 13
(1677), has been held not to be part of the local law,2 2 6 nor has
the famous statute of 9 Anne, Chapter 20 (710), concerning
informations in the nature of quo warranto, been received or
adopted in Delaware.2 2 7  The charter of June 20, 1632, to Lord
Baltimore of Maryland and Avalon, granted the right to enact
"Laws . . . consonant to Reason, and . . . not repugnant or
contrary, but (so far'as conveniently may be) agreeable to the
Laws, Statutes, Customs, and Rights of this Our Kingdom of
England".2 .2 At first there seems to have been a failure on the
part of the colonial courts to recognize that applicable inherited
statutes were part of the local law ;229 but not only are pre-settle-
ment acts of Parliament part of the common law of Maryland,
but also such post-settlement statutes as the act of 8 & 9 William
III, Chapter i i (1696), for better preventing frivolous suits,
2 3 0
and the statute of 4 Anne, Chapter 16, Section 12 (705), per-
mitting the plea of payment to a writ of scire facias.231  In Ar-
ticle III of the Declaration of Rights, the constitution of Novem-
ber II, 1776, recognized "that the inhabitants of Maryland are
I THORPE, Op. cit. supra note 52, at 557, 562.
'Ex parte Burgess, i Del. Ch. 233, 24o (1822).
'Conner v. Pennington, i Del. Ch. 177, 182 (1821).
= Allerdice v. Truss, 2 Houst. 268, 273 (Del. i86o).
' Brooks v. Delaware, 79 At. 790, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1126 (1911).
= 3 THORPE, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1669, 168o.
Lloyd's Lessee v. Hemsley, mupra note 72.
'Wilmer v. Harris, 5 Har. & J. i (Md. I820).
' McCullough v. Franklin Coal Co., 21 Md. 256 (1863).
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entitled . . . to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as
existed at the time of their first emigration, and . . . have been
found applicable . . and of such others as have since been
made in England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced,
used and practiced by the courts of law or equity *. ,,.*2 The
Declarations of Rights of the subsequent constitutions of Mary-
land extend this provision to include such beneficial British stat-
utes as existed on July 4, 1776.233 The District of Columbia in-
herits the law of Maryland which was in force on February 27,
18oi.234
The North Carolina Law of 1715, Chapter 31, Section 7,235
extended to the province all laws providing for the privileges of the
people and security of trade, for the limitation-of actions, and for
preventing immorality and fraud. In addition, all applicable
canon and civil laws as administered in the ecclesiastical courts
of England, wherever suited to local conditions, have been deemed
to be part of the common law brought over by the first settlers.
23
6
The accepted British statutes of South Carolina are those pub-
lished by Joseph Keble, of Gray's Inn, with supplements down to
November 15, 1709.2'
The Supreme Court of Georgia, speaking through Lumpkin,
J., indicated the relative effect which is to be given to English
statutes in that state, as follows:
"The laws of Georgia may be thus graduated, with refer-
ence to their obligation or authority. ist, The Constitution
of the United States. 2d, Traties entered into by the Fed-
eral Government before, or 'since, the adoption of the Con-
stitution. 3d, Laws of the United States, made in pursuance
of the Constitution, laws and form of government of the
State. 4th, The Constitution of the State. 5th, The Stat-
utes of the State. 6th, Provincial Acts that were in force
3 THoRPE, op. cit. supra note 52, at i686.
"3 THORPE, op.. cit. mpra note 52, at 1713, 1742, 1780.
"'Kendall v. U. S., i2 Pet. 524, 614 (U. S. 1838); D. C. CODE (1911)
§ 164. There is a list of British fstatutes referred to in local cases, in TORBERT,
INDEx-DIGEST OF D. C. CASES (19o8) 219.
SSupra p. 2 16.
Crump v. Morgan, supra note i6o.
BREVA AD, PUBLIC STATUTE LAw OF So. CAR. (1814) tit. 70. See ibid. 295
for a list of such statutes, ranging from 9 Hen. III to 9 Anne, inclusive.
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and binding on the 14th day of May, 1776, so far as they are
not contrary to the Constitution, laws and form of govern-
ment of the State. 7 th, The Common Law of England, and
such of the Statute Laws as were usually in force before
the revolution, with the foregoing limitation. It is the pecu-
liar province of the Courts to ascertain and declare when
any two of these several species of law conflict with each
other; and then it follows, as a matter of course, that the
less must yield to the greater. And on this point there is no
dearth of precedents."
' 238
Schley's Digest of English Statutes, published in 1826, is con-
sidered an exhaustive compilation of such British statutes as have
been inherited or adopted in Georgia. In 1845 its contents were
arranged with Georgia legislation, in the officially-authorized com-
pilation, entitled Hotchkin's State Law of Georgia. It has been
held that the Georgia Code does not affect the doctrine of such
parts of the common law as have not been expressly repealed by
statute.
239
The subject matter of this article is frequently classed in the
books as a subdivision of American common law. This may
account, in part, for numerous instances where the tables of con-
tents of law reports omit any mention of acts of Parliament dis-
cussed in legal opinions.
"Flint River Steamship Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 204, 205 (1848).
I Higdon v. Bell, 25 Ga. App. 54, lO2 S. E. 546 (1920).
